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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4(1) (Supp. 1979). 
No malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider may be brought unless it is commenced within two 
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (Supp. 1979). 
No malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff 
gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent 
to commence an action. Such notice shall include a 
general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the 
occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific alle-
gations of misconduct on the part of the prospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other 
damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affi-
davit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. 
Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and 
in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint 
in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have 
been served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall 
be served within the time allowed for a commencing a 
malpractice action against a health care provider. If 
the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period, the time for 
commencing the malpractice action against the health 
care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the 
date of service of notice. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (Supp. 1976). 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the 
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which 
actions may be commenced against health care providers 
while limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be rea-
sonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other 
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims. 
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1986, her claim, initiated on March 4, 1988, is absolutely time 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
This case came on regularly for hearing on May 7, 1990; 
however, because neither party appeared, the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, Seventh Judicial District Court Judge, ruled oral 
arguments had been waived. Judge Bunnell ruled in favor of 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment finding specifically: 
The service of the first intent to commence action was 
timely, but when the plaintiff failed to request the 
prelitigation panel review within the time limitation 
as specified, that notice became null and void. 
The service of the second notice of intent to 
commence action was beyond the two-year statute of 
limitations as required for the commencement of this 
type of action. 
(Ruling on Defendant Munsey's Motion for Summary Judgment 
attached as Addendum "C".) On June 1, 1990, the Court entered an 
order reflecting there was no genuine issue of any material fact 
relative to plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute of 
limitations and therefore defendant was entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. (Bunnell's Order, attached as 
Addendum "D".) 
On June 14, 1990, plaintiff moved for a new trial or for 
reconsideration. In her petition for a new trial, plaintiff made 
many of the arguments she is making on this appeal; however, none 
of these arguments were made at the time the Motion for Summary 
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Judgment was being considered by Judge Bunnell. Accordingly, on 
June 15, 1990, the trial court judge denied plaintiff's motions. 
The Court noted: "The plaintiff in her memorandum attempts to 
reargue matters already determined by the court, and further 
attempts to assert additional matters of constitutionality of 
statutes that should have been presented during the prior deter-
mination.11 (Ruling on Motion for New Trial and for 
Reconsideration, attached as Addendum "E".) This appeal followed 
the trial court's determination of finality. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Dr. Munsey treated Dana Gramlich for a nervous disorder over 
a short period of time in early 1985. His office notes are 
attached as Addendum "F". His notes reflect the last time he saw 
the patient was on March 14, 1985. 
On January 5, 1986, a seizure led plaintiff to the care of a 
neurosurgeon who diagnosed her brain tumor. The tumor was 
excised on January 9, 1S86, and, to date, has not recurred. 
(Medical Records of Dr. Peter Hielbrun.) It is undisputed that 
plaintiff's brain tumor was diagnosed on January 5, 1986. She 
alleges in her Complaint that Dr. Munsey missed the diagnosis in 
March, 1985. 
In her first Notice of Intent to Commence an Action, dated 
December 21, 1987, plaintiff's attorney stated unequivocally that 
defendant's negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on 
January 5, 1986. Plaintiff failed to follow-up with a timely 
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request for prelitigation review as mandated by § 78-14-12(2), 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989). Consequently, defendant filed a 
Motion for an Order denying plaintiff's tardy request. (Motion 
for Order denying prelitigation review attached as Addendum "G".) 
Plaintiff then filed an amended notice of intent. On this 
second notice, plaintiff's attorney attempted to change the date 
plaintiff allegedly discovered the negligence of the defendant. 
This new notice was followed immediately by a prelitigation 
hearing request. Following this request, a hearing was scheduled 
and held on May 3, 1988. The rules of the Department of Business 
Regulation, Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing as 
well as the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act prohibit any appeal 
or challenge to the findings of the prelitigation panel. 
Finally, plaintiff's Complaint was filed on June 15, 1988, 
five and a half months after the first invalid notice and over 
three months after the amended notice was filed. 
Clearly, plaintiff's second notice, dated March 4, 1988, was 
filed over two years after the plaintiff's brain tumor was diag-
nosed, treated and excised. The surgeon who successfully removed 
the tumor testified during his deposition that often the first 
sign of a tumor such as plaintiff's is a seizure. (Deposition of 
Dr. Heilbrun at pages 7, 16.) The neurosurgeon testified plain-
tiff would have required surgery no matter when the tumor was 
recognized and that there was no way to say to any degree of 
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medical probability that her outcome, which has to date been 
problem-free, would have been altered by an earlier diagnosis. 
(Heilbrun Depo., pp. 9, 14-15, 16.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff should not be allowed to frustrate the avowed 
design of Utahfs Rules of Civil Procedure which "shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The plaintiff attempts to take advantage of a 
"window," but she misreads the statute. To comply with the 
statutory guidelines, she needed to follow her first Notice of 
Intent to Commence an Action with the statutorily mandated 
request for prelitigation review. Instead, she filed an Amended 
Notice to Commence Action. Accordingly, the first notice is 
invalid because no timely request for prelitigation review was 
made and no complaint was filed before the expiration of the 
statutorily prescribed 120 days. The second, amended notice is 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, the trial court 
properly granted defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. Such a 
determination should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Finally, the constitutional issues raised are untimely and 
inappropriate. They should form no basis for this Court's 
decisions on review. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A
- Plaintiff's First Notice of Intent Expired Because 
Plaintiff Failed to Timely Request Prelitigation Review 
as Mandated by the Utah Statute. 
Plaintiff's first Notice of Intent was rendered invalid for 
failing to comply with § 78-14-12(2) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989). 
The Notice was dated December 21, 1987. The Request (attached as 
Addendum "H") was dated March 2, 1988. This Request was untimely 
as it was filed beyond sixty days in violation of section 
78-14-12(2) which requires: 
The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall 
file a request for prelitigation panel review with the 
Department of Commerce within 60 days after the filing 
of a statutory notice of intent to commence action 
under Section 78-14-8." 
In a timely fashion, defendant opposed the tardy request for 
prelitigation panel review. A second Notice of Intent was filed 
and a second request for prelitigation review dated March 11, 
1988 was filed with the second notice. (This second request is 
attached as Addendum "I".) However, it was never made clear one 
way or the other by the Department of Business Regulations 
whether the scheduled hearing was in response to the second 
request or whether the Motion for Order Denying Request for 
Prelitigation Panel Review was granted or denied. In any event, 
a hearing was held on May 3, 1988. 
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The findings of these prelitigation panels are non-binding 
and advisory in nature. Specifically, § 78-14-14 Utah Code Ann, 
(Supp. 1985) states: "There is no judicial or other review or 
appeal of the panel's decision or recommendations." 
Consequently, defendant could not, even had he wished to, object 
to the panel convening or to its determinations. 
In Utah, no malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff complies 
with the statutory time lines encoded in the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. Thus, for any medical malpractice claim filed 
after July 1, 1985, the claimant must meet the prelitigation 
panel review jurisdictional requirement as a condition precedent 
to commencing litigation. Thus, the statutory language of the 
Utah Code establishes jurisdictional requirements that must be 
fulfilled before a court will recognize a claimant's action. 
Further, the Utah legislature has specifically stated the 
consequence of noncompliance with the Health Care Malpractice 
Act: The complaint cannot be filed. 
The [prelitigation panel] proceedings are informal and 
non-binding, but are compulsory as a condition prece-
dent to commencing litigation. 
Section 78-14-12(1)(c) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989). 
The language of the statute is unequivocal. The Utah 
Supreme Court has noted: 
There are numerous instances in which the law requires 
fulfillment of a condition precedent before the filing 
-7-
of a complaint. A failure to comply with the condition 
may result in a dismissal. 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), citing Costello 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S. Ct. 532, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 
(1961) . 
For failure to comply with the clear mandate contained in 
the Health Care Malpractice Act, plaintifffs first Notice of 
Intent fails as a matter of law since no timely request for panel 
review was made. 
Plaintiff erroneously attempts to rely on language which 
would extend the time to file a Complaint. Specifically, 
§ 78-14-8 states: 
If the notice [of intent to commence an action] is 
served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of 
the applicable time period, the time for commencing the 
malpractice action against the health care provider 
shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service 
of notice. 
Here, plaintiff missed this deadline as well since the Complaint 
was not filed for over five months after the first notice of 
intent. Based on the undisputed facts, the first notice is 
invalid as a matter of law. 
B. Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Intent Was Filed Over Two 
Years After the Plaintiff Discovered the Inlurv. 
The amended or second Notice of Intent was properly followed 
by a timely request for panel review. However, the amended 
notice is absolutely time barred by the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations since plaintiff knew, or should have 
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known, she suffered an injury at the time her brain tumor was 
properly diagnosed and excised. 
Thus, by January of 1986, plaintiff had all the facts 
required by Utah courts to conclude that her injury could be 
attributable to the negligence of the defendant. There is no 
justification for waiting over two years before commencing mal-
practice litigation. Consequently, plaintiff's claims are barred 
as a matter of law by the applicable statute of limitations. 
The relevant section of the Health Care Malpractice Act 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended) states: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider may be brought unless it is commenced within two 
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs. 
The adoption of this discovery rule gives patients two years 
to bring a claim against a physician. In order for the statute 
to begin to run, the Utah Supreme Court requires that the patient 
know, or, through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
known, that she had sustained some injury and that the injury 
suffered can be attributed to negligent conduct on the part of 
the defendant. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
Case law interpreting the Foil decision has narrowly defined 
the parameters of "legal injury." In Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. 
Supp. 152 (Utah 1984), reversed on other grounds, 801 F.2d 368 
(10th Cir. 1986), a medical malpractice action was brought 
against the examining physician to recover for injuries suffered 
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by an infant due to an alleged misdiagnosis. The court held 
plaintiff's action was barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions since the parent of the infant was aware of the facts that 
would have led a reasonable person to conclude that the cause of 
action existed more than two years before filing suit. It was 
the plaintiff's position that she had no medical training and was 
led to believe by other doctors that the defendant's alleged 
negligence could not be legally proven. But the court ruled: 
"That argument is without merit and confuses 'legal injury' with 
a legal conclusion of negligence." 598 F. Supp. at 154. 
The Harqett court went on to explain: 
Under Foil v. Ballinqer and its progeny, a legal deter-
mination of negligence is not necessary to start the 
statute of limitations. Rather, the crucial question 
is whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts that 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may 
have a cause of action against the health care pro-
vider. Those facts include the existence of an injury, 
its cause and the possibility of negligence. 
Id. 155, cites omitted, emphasis in original. 
Similarly, in Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, Inc., 
773 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that the 
statute began to run once the patient discovered an injury and 
attributed its cause to the negligence of the defendant. 
Plaintiff's second Notice does not fall within a "window" 
period: It was not served "less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period," Section 78-14-8, Utah 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1979); rather, it was served after the statutory 
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deadline for initiating a claim had expired. Here, since plain-
tiff filed the first Notice less than 90 days prior to the expi-
ration of the applicable time period, she would have an extension 
of 120 days from the first Notice to file a complaint, not to 
file a second Notice. Thus, this section does not apply to the 
facts of this case. By definition, an "intent to commence" is a 
ninety-day notice of a prospective plan to file a lawsuit; it is 
only the Complaint which "commences the malpractice action" as 
required by the statute. 
Furthermore, to allow a plaintiff to take advantage of the 
extension described in § 78-14-8 by repetitively filing "notices" 
frustrates the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legis-
lature to provide a reasonable time in which actions 
may be commenced against health care providers while 
limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be rea-
sonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other 
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims. 
S 78-14-2, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1976). 
Because plaintiff discovered her injuries and attributed 
their cause to the defendant by January of 1986, the "Amended" 
Notice of Intent to Commence Litigation dated March 4, 1988 was 
not timely filed and the plaintiff's claims are absolutely time 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 
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Should the plaintiff argue that she did not know the full 
extent of her alleged injuries until much later, the two year 
statute of limitations would still apply to bar her claim. Such 
an argument was addressed in both the Harqett case, supra, and in 
Kaqoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (1986), in which the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the Utah District Court ruling that the 
plaintiff's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions per Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4(1) (1953). The Maqoc court 
stated: 
[P]laintiffsf counsel argues that [plaintiff did not] 
know the full extent of defendants' negligence, which 
was only learned later. The district court rejected 
his argument, as do we. To adopt such reasoning would, 
in practical effect, wipe out the statute. 
Id. at 379, emphasis in original. See also, Hove v. McMaster, 
621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) (holding there is no requirement to wait 
for the pain to be diagnosed before the two-year statute of limi-
tations will bar a medical malpractice action); Reiser v. Lohner, 
641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) (holding belief condition complained of 
may be temporary rather than permanent did not prevent applica-
tion of two-year statute of limitations to bar plaintiff's 
claim); Guiley v. Hammaker, 640 P,2d 664, 667 (Or. 1981) ("we 
would be abrogating the policy of the statute of limitations if 
we were to hold that a plaintiff with notice of both an injury 
and its cause would be excused from bringing an action until he 
had determined the full extent of the consequences of the wrong 
done to him; the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's 
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complaint was correct"); Steele v. Organon, Inc., 719 P.2d 920, 
922 (Wash. 1986) ("generally, if the plaintiff is aware of some 
injury, the statute of limitations begins to run even if he does 
not know the full extent of his injuries"); and United States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S 111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) 
(wherein the Supreme Court expressly disapproved circuit deci-
sions holding that accrual does not occur until a claimant has 
knowledge that the acts causing injury might constitute medical 
malpractice). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENIED 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND FOR 
RECONSIDERATION. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
summary judgment is available and "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
In the views of both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court, summary judgment is regarded not as a dis-
favored procedural short-cut but rather as an integral part of 
the rules of procedure designed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of litigation. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986); McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 
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431 (Utah 1980); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
Summary judgment is not only appropriate, but is mandated against 
a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish an essential element of his case. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 2548. 
Based on the facts presented to the trial court, there can 
be no question that the First Notice of Intent was not followed 
within sixty days by the statutorily mandated request for panel 
review. Further, the only evidence before the court was plain-
tiff's allegation defendant negligently failed to diagnose her 
brain tumor; it was undisputed the tumor was diagnosed by 
January 5, 1986 and was successfully removed on January 9, 1986. 
Thus, there is no evidence to rebut the conclusion that the 
second, amended Notice of Intent was time-barred by the appli-
cable statute of limitations as the surgery to excise the brain 
tumor constituted sufficient grounds for a reasonable person to 
be put on notice that her prior treating physician had missed the 
diagnosis. The trial court properly found there was no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and properly concluded defendant 
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Further, there is no basis for reconsideration or for a new 
trial. Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties is grounds for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless refusal 
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to take such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice. 
Plaintiff makes a belated attempt to salvage her constitu-
tional claims by framing her motion as one for reconsideration. 
However, the cases she cites in support for this proposition do 
not support her contentions. Specifically, none of the cases 
cited by plaintiff allow a party who has lost a motion for sum-
mary judgment to, by way of a motion for reconsideration, insert 
constitutional claims which were not properly raised below. 
Thus, while a motion for a new trial following summary judgment 
is procedurally correct, plaintiff cannot thereby be excused for 
failing to raise constitutional issues at the time the summary 
judgment motion was pending. Moonlake Elec. v. Ultra Systems W. 
Const., 767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App. 1988); Ferris v. Jennings, 
595 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1979). 
As there is no evidence before the Court which adequately 
raises a genuine issue of fact concerning either plaintifffs 
failure to comply with the time restrictions of the Utah statute 
with regard to requesting a prelitigation hearing, filing a 
Complaint or complying with the statute of limitations, summary 
judgment was proper and should be affirmed. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Construction# Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Further, the refusal to grant a new trial is a matter left to the 
discretion of the trial judge and the decision can be reversed 
only if it is shown the judge abused that discretion and acted 
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unreasonably. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988). 
Here, the trial court's rulings were supported by uncontroverted 
facts. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT NOW RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL 
QUESTIONS WHICH WERE NOT TIMELY RAISED BELOW. 
It is well settled that this Court will not address issues 
raised on appeal or on a motion for a new trial which were not 
raised at the trial level. Thus, the constitutional issues 
raised by plaintiff for the first time on appeal cannot be 
addressed. Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik 
Ve Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Inslev Mfc. Corp. v. 
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986). 
Along with being untimely, the constitutional concerns 
raised by plaintiff are inapplicable. The avowed legislative 
purpose for treating the class of health care providers differ-
ently from other defendants is stated in the Health Care 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) § 78-14-2, 
which provides as follows: 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of 
suits and claims for damages and the amount of judg-
ments and settlements arising from health care has 
increased greatly in recent years. . . . In view of 
these recent rends and with the intention of allevi-
ating the adverse effects which these trends are 
producing in the public's health care system, it is 
necessary to protect the public interest by enacting 
measures designed to encourage private insurance com-
panies to continue to provide health related malprac-
tice insurance while at the same time establishing a 
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mechanism to insure the availability of insurance in 
the event that it becomes unavailable from private 
companies. 
Thus, the Health Care Malpractice Act was premised upon the 
need to protect and insure the continued availability of health 
care services to the public. The legislature "exercised its 
discretionary prerogative in determining that the shortening of 
the statute of limitation would insure the continued availability 
of adequate health care services." Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 1981). 
Further, the Supreme Court of Utah has specifically upheld 
the constitutionality of the statute of limitations applicable to 
medical malpractice claims. In Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 78-14-4 
does not violate the equal protection of the law requirements of 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. The Supreme Court 
further held that said Section is not an unconstitutional 
"special law" in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article VI, 
Section 26. 
Similarly, in Harqett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 
1984), reversed on other grounds, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986) 
the Utah District Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 
78-14-4 and determined that the statute does not violate equal 
protection of laws; does not violate due process of law; and does 
not violate the open court provisions of the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 11. Harqett, applies to the facts of this 
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case in that it involved a medical malpractice action against a 
doctor for an alleged delay in diagnosis. The Tenth Circuit on 
appeal did not address the constitutionality of the statute, 
because the question of constitutionality was not timely raised. 
The Court affirmed that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the 
Health Care Malpractice Act statute of limitations where the 
action was brought more than two years after the plaintiff dis-
covered "facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that he may have a cause of action against a health care pro-
vider." 801 F.2d at 371. 
Finally, decisions reached by both the Utah Supreme Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals, decisions which were reached after 
other statutes of repose were challenged, have upheld the two-
year statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose 
encoded in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). See, for example, Sorensen v. 
Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Dechamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 
471 (Utah App. 1989). Thus, even if the constitutional issues 
were properly and timely raised, they would have no basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed facts, the trial judge properly 
granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. There is no 
genuine issue as to the fact plaintiff failed to request a pre-
litigation panel hearing within sixty days of her first notice of 
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intent as required by law. She then failed to file her Complaint 
in time. Therefore, the first Notice of Intent is invalid. 
The second Notice is barred by the two-year statute of limi-
tations. Reasonable minds could not differ and conclude other 
than plaintiff's claim for delayed diagnosis of a brain tumor was 
"discovered" when the proper diagnosis was made. This Court 
should therefore affirm the lower court's rulings. 
DATED this itfik day of February, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Elliotl: ST- Williams 
By ^tl^l^NU^^ 
Elizabeth King 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to appellant, postage prepaid, this 
day of February, 1991. 
Elizabeth Kino 
J 
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A Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
B Amended Notice to Commence Action 
C Ruling on Defendant Munseyfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
D Order 
E Ruling on Motion for New Trial and for 
Consideration 
F Dr. Munseyfs Office Records 
G Motion for Order Denying Request for Prelitigation 
Panel Review 
H First Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review 
I Second Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION 
TO: Jay P. Munsey, M.D. 
82 North Main 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreck Drive 
Moab, Utah 84532 
You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that 
this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an 
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic 
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business 
during the time period in question. Pursuant to the cited statute, you are also given 
notice of the following: 
1. Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each of 
you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich. 
2. Persons Involved. The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich. 
The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which 
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the 
named individuals. 
3. Date. Time and Place of Occurrence. The negligence occurred from 
March, 1985, through January 5, 1986. The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his 
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office 
at the address stated above. The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on 
January 5, 1986. 
4. Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face 
and a general unwell feeling. On March 16 Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told 
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot 
pack. On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether 
the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that that was not 
the case. In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munsey at his office. 
She again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her 
to a neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her 
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not 
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he 
advised her to continue taking it. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the 
same symptoms described above. Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there 
might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her 
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve. 
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months. 
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the 
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor. 
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which 
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but she was resuscitated by her husband. 
It was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to 
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986. 
The failures of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain 
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they each owed to 
her. 
5. Nature of Injuries. The full extent of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not 
known at present. Her injuries include, however, the following: She is required to 
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take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her 
subject to an increased risk that any children she had would have had birth defects. 
She also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear 
causes her on-going distress and suffering. She has not regained her strength or full 
use of her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the 
surgery. 
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this -<V day of December, 1987. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that the statements contained 
therein are true to the best of her knowledge, information and belief. 
DU^g MA/C^AZP 
DANA GRAMLICH 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ill . day of December, 1987. 
j e Z 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
•t 
oM 
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AMENDED NOTICE TO COMMENCE ACTION 
TO: Jay P. Munsey, MD. 
82 North Main 
Moab, UT 84532 
Richard Home, D.C 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab, UT 84532 
You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that 
this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an 
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic 
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business 
during the time period in question. Pursuant to the cited statute, you arc also given 
notice of the following: 
1. Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each of 
you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich. 
2. Persons Involved. The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich, 
The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which 
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the 
named individuals. 
3. Date. Time and Place of Occurrence. The negligence occurred from 
March, 1985, through January 5, 1986. The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his 
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office 
at the address stated above. The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on 
January 20, 1988, after receiving a report from Dr. Warren F. Gorman. 
4. Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face 
and a general unwell feeling. On March 16, Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told 
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot 
pack. On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether 
the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that was not the 
case. In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munscy at his office. She 
again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her to a 
neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her 
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not 
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he 
advised her to continue taking it. 
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the 
same symptoms described above. Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there 
might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her 
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve. 
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months. 
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the 
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor. 
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which 
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but was resuscitated by her husband. It 
was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to 
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986. 
The failure of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain 
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they owed to her, 
5. Nature of Injuries. The full extend of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not 
known at present. Her injuries, however, include the following: She is required to 
take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her 
subject to an increased risk that any child she had would have had birth defects. She 
also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear causes 
2 
her on-going distress and suffering. She has not regained her strength or full us£.of 
her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the 
surgery. 
GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY. 
p. 
DATED this Lr day of March, 1988. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the 
foregoing Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that the statements 
contained therein are true and to the best of her knowledge, information and belief. 
IfU <LtrAcL 
DANA GRAMLICH 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this y : c - day of March, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., | 
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC ) 
CLINIC, ] 
Defendants. ; 
i RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil Nos. 5686 
The defendant, Jay P. Munsey, has filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment contending that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact relative to plaintiff's failure to comply with 
the Statute cf Limitations that is applicable to this action. 
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the granting of the 
Motion, and both parties have submitted their Memorandums of 
Legal Points and Authorities and supporting documents and 
affidavits. 
Oral arguments were requested and set for May 7, 1990, 
and neither party appeared at the time set so the Court finds 
that oral arguments have been waived, and rules on the Motion 
as here and after stated. 
The undisputed facts show that Dr. Munsey commenced 
treating the plaintiff for a nervous disorder in March of 1985, 
and did not diagnose a brain tumor during that treatment period. 
That the plaintiff suffered a seizure on January 5, 
1986, and underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor 
on January 9, 1986. 
On December 21, 19^7, plaintiff's attorney served 
defendant Munsey with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, 
and stated that the negligence was discovered on January 5, 
1986. 
The plaintiff failed to request a pre-litigation 
review as specified in Section 78-14-12(c) within the 60 days 
as mandated in that Section. 
The plaintiff then served a new Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action on defendant on March 4, 1988, which stated 
that the negligence was discovered on January 20, 1988. 
The question of when the two year Statute of 
Limitations begins to run has recently been reviewed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Deschamps v. Pulley, 123 Ut.Adv.Rep. 
34. It is quite clear from a review of that case and the legal 
principles set: forth that the plaintiff in this case knew, or 
should have known, on January 5, 1986, and certainly no later 
than January 9, 1986, that she had suffered an injury and that 
this injury was caused by negligence. 
It would be obvious to any reasonable person at that 
time that the Doctor had failed to properly diagnose her 
nervous system disorder and that there was the possibilty, and 
even the probablity of negligence. 
2 
The service of the first intent to commence action was 
timely, but when the plaintiff failed to request the 
pre-litigation panel review within the time limitation as 
specified, that notice became null and void. 
The service of the second notice of intent to commence 
action was beyond the two year Statute of Limitations as 
required for the commencement of this type of action. 
THEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to defendant Jay P. Munsey, and authorizes an order 
dismissing this case as to him. 
The Attorney for this defendant is directed to prepare 
findings and a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1990. 
// 
BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East 300 North 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo UT 84603 
Thomas J. Erbin 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys at Law 
City Center I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
DATED this /3//£ day of May, 1990, 
Secretary 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD ] 
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY ; 
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i O R D E R 
) Civil No. 5686 
Defendant James P. Munsey, M.D.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment having been fully briefed, and both parties having 
waived oral arguments originally scheduled for May 7, 1990, 
and plaintiff being represented by her attorney, Don R. 
Peterson of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and defendant having 
been represented by his attorneys Elliott J. Williams and 
Elizabeth King Brennan of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, and 
the court having reviewed the Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities and supporting documents and Affidavits and being 
fully advised, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted since there is no 
genuine issue of any material fact relative to plaintiff's 
failure to comply with the statute of limitations applicable 
to this action and defendant is entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law as reflected by this Court's ruling on 
this matter dated May 15, 1990. 
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above 
entitled action be and the same hereby is dismissed with 
prejudice as to the defendant Jay P. Munsey, each party to 
bear its own costs. ^^/^ 
DATED this / " day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing O R D E R by depositing the same in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dor. R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
Delphi Building 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo UT 84603 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Richard Home, D.C. 
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab UT 84532 
DATED this /s*T~ day of June, 1990. 
Secretary 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD 1 
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY ] 
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, ] 
Defendants. } 
i RULING ON MOTION 
> FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
> FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 5686 
The plaintiff has filed a motion for a new trial 
under Civil Procedure Rule 59(a), and for the Court to 
reconsider its prior ruling granting summary judgment to 
defendant Munsey, and states that she is relying on Civil 
Rule 54(b). 
Neither one of these Rules have any application to 
plaintiff's Motion since there was no trial, and certainly a 
motion for new trial could not be granted. Rule 54(b) has no 
application since there is no rule providing for a motion to 
reconsider a matter that has already been fully determined. 
The plaintiff in her memorandum attempts to reargue 
matters already determined by the Court, and further attempts 
to assert additional matters of constitutionality of statutes 
that should have been presented during the prior 
determination. 
For these reasons, the Court hereby denies the 
Motion for a New Trial and for any reconsideration. 
DATED this /Jz day of June, 1990. 
BOYD feUNNEJ^T, District Judge 
0002 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
FOR RECONSIDERATION by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East 300 North 
P. O. box 778 
Provo UT 84603 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab UT 84532 
DATED this /ffZ^O day of June, 1990, 
Secretary 
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Jay P. Munsey, M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, 
MOTION FOR ORDER DENYING 
Petitioner, REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION 
PANEL REVIEW 
v. 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., and 
RICHARD HORNE,-D.C, 
Case No. 
Respondents. 
Respondent, Jay P. Munsey, M.D., requests the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing to deny petitioner's 
Request for a Prelitigation Panel Review dated March 2, 1988, 
for the reason that the petitioner has failed to comply with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (1953, as amended) which requires 
the filing of a request for panel review within 60 days after 
the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action. 
Petitioner served the Notice of Intent to Commence Action by 
mail on or about December 21, 1987, more than 60 days prior to 
the filing of petitioner's Request for Prelitigation Panel 
Review. 
DATED this jf* day of March, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Jfc BY 
ELLIOttA J. WILLIAMS 
Attorney©Ofor Respondent, 
Jay P. Munsey, M.D. 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
CORINNE M. GLASS being duly sworn, 
says that he/she is employed in the law offices of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for respondent, 
Jay P. Munsev, M.D., 
herein; that he/she served the attached Motion for OrdeiT 
Denying Request for Prelitigation Panel Review 
(Case No. before the Division of Occupa-
tional & Professional Licensing, Department of Business 
Regulation) upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Attorneys for Petitioner: 
Don R. Petersen 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 14th day of March , 198J3 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 14th dai 
, 198 8 . March 
My Commission Expires: 
f^u 2 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
TabH 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Our File No. 17,857 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D. and 
RICHARD HORNE, D.C, 
Respondents. 
REQUEST FOR PRE-LITIGATION 
PANEL REVIEW 
COMES NOW Dana Gramlich, by and through her counsel, and hereby requests a 
Prelitigation Panel Review of the medical-negligence action which Dana Gramlich is 
initiating against Dr. Jay P. Munsey and Dr. Richard Home, as more fully described in 
Dana Gramlich' Notice of Intent to Commence Action, filed pursuant to the Utah Code, 
a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference incorporated herein. 
Respondents were served by certified mail the Notices of Intent to Commence 
Action, copies of the receipts/of which are attached hereto. :eipts/ot 
DATED this "< day of March, 1988. 
* ^ ^ > £ ^ £ 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and xrorrcct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this (T day of March, 1988. 
Jay P. Munsey, MD. 
82 North Main 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Utah State Department of 
Business Regulation 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
SECRETARY 
Tab! 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone. (801) 373-6345 
Our File No. 17,857 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANA GRAMLICH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D. and 
RICHARD HORNE, D.C, 
Respondents. 
REQUEST FOR PRE-LITIGATION 
PANEL REVIEW 
COMES NOW Dana Gramlich, by and through her counsel, and hereby requests a 
Prelitigation Panel Review of the medical-negligence action which Dana Gramlich is 
initiating against Dr. Jay P. Munsey and Dr. Richard Home, as more fully described in 
Dana Gramlich's Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action, filed pursuant to the 
Utah Code, a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference incorporated herein. 
Respondents were served by certified mail the Notices of Intent to Commence 
Action, copies of the receipts of which are attached hereto. 
DATED this SS^Saw of March, 1988. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attornevs for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
lid, this day of March, 1988. the following, postage prcpa  
Jay P. Munscy, M.D. 
82 North Main 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Richard Home, D.C. 
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic 
478 Millcreek Drive 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Utah State Department of 
Business Regulation 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
SECRETARY 
